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The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) increasingly has turned to plea bargains to resolve the cases before 
it.  A number of factors motor this trend.  One is administrative: the ICTY 
has been subject to considerable pressure from the United Nations Security 
Council and donor states to accelerate its work.1 Another is the desire to 
obtain acknowledgements of responsibility from perpetrators. Moreover, 
there is concern that, as time passes, the memories of witnesses dim. The 
rigours of direct and cross examination may retraumatise those who have 
survived mass atrocity.  ICTY judges also have expressed their 
understanding that guilty pleas promote reconciliation in areas afflicted by 
violence2 and the rehabilitation of offenders.3 Plea bargaining also may 
serve important political purposes for the ICTY with regard to its 
relationships with peacekeepers and administrators throughout the territory 
of the former Yugoslavia.4     
                                                
 
Plea bargains initially were disfavoured by the ICTY.5 Amendments 
to the ICTY’s positive law documents, however, have since encouraged plea 
bargains.6 Assuredly, plea bargains also are permitted by the positive law of 
other international criminal justice institutions and have surfaced in the 
jurisprudence and case managements strategies of those institutions.7 The 
 
1  Marlise Simons, Plea Deals Being Used to Clear Balkans War Tribunal’s Docket, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 18 2003).   
2   Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61-S (ICTY Trial Chamber, March 30, 2004), para. 134. 
3  Deronjić, separate opinion of Judge Mumba, para. 2. 
4  For example, in the Todorović case, the Prosecution withdrew a large number of counts and settled 
on a plea process and thereby obviated of Todorović’s defences, namely that he had been kidnapped and 
held illegally by NATO SFOR forces.  
5     Michael Scharf, BALKAN JUSTICE 67 (1997); Nancy Amoury Combs, International Decisions:  
Prosecutor v. Plavšić, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 929, 934 (2003).  
6  See ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rules 62bis, 62ter (permitting both guilty pleas and 
plea agreements, although plea agreements have been preferred in practice). 
7   ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rules 62, 62(B); Sierra Leone Special Court Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, Rule 62. The East Timor panels also encourage plea bargaining, citing among 
other benefits the fact that it aides in the administration of justice.  Prosecutor v. João Fernandez, Case No. 
01/00.C.G.2000 (January 25, 2000), Dili District Court, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, para. 20, aff’d 
Court of Appeal, Criminal Appeal N. 2001/12 (July 29, 2001); Prosecutor v. João Franca da Silva, Case 
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ICTY’s turn to plea bargains, however, is sharp. Moreover, it touches much 
more than pragmatic case management concerns. For example, it implicates 
sentencing: to what extent can plea bargains mitigate sentence? Do they 
operate in addition to other closely related factors, such as cooperation with 
the prosecution, remorse, acceptance of responsibility, or voluntary 
surrender? Plea bargaining also implicates the Prosecutor’s recourse to joint 
criminal liability theories: to what extent can negotiated testimony inculpate 
other defendants? The turn to plea bargains affects the ICTY’s relationships 
with national courts. On this latter note, it remains unclear whether charges 
dropped by the ICTY Prosecutor as part of a plea agreement can be pursued 
by such courts exercising jurisdiction on the basis of nationality, 
territoriality, or universality.  Plea bargains also present a complex interface 
with the trial ideologies of the ICTY, in particular retributivism. 
 
At this stage, we think it helpful to clarify what exactly is meant by 
‘plea bargain’ as operationalised in the work of the ICTY.  As we 
understand it, the term plea bargain actually contemplates two different 
concepts, as well as a number of variations between the two.   
 
At one end of the spectrum is the admission of guilt, referred to by the 
ICTY as the ‘pure guilty plea.’8  Here, ideally the defendant comes forward, 
pleads guilty to the charges in the indictment, pledges to cooperate, conveys 
remorse, and accepts responsibility – all without expressly contracting for 
anything in return. The Trial Chamber, then, may consider the plea as a 
mitigating factor in sentencing; before reaching this stage, however, the 
Trial Chamber must be satisfied that there is a sufficient factual basis for the 
crime and for the accused’s participation in it and that the plea was 
voluntary, informed and unequivocal.9  Generally speaking, this is the 
procedure contemplated by Rules 62(VI) and 62bis of the ICTY Rules. The 
pure guilty plea is not a concept historically alien to international criminal 
tribunals.10 
                                                                                                                                                 
No. 04a/2001 (December 5, 2001), Dili District Court, Special Panel for Serious Crimes, para 145; 
Prosecutor v. Agustinho Atolan, Case No. 3/2003 (June 9, 2003), Dili District Court, Special Panel for 
Serious Crimes, p. 7.  
8  Deronjić, para. 135. 
9  Prosecutor v. Todorović, Case No. IT-95-9/1 (ICTY Trial Chamber, July 31, 2001), para. 23. In 
making these assessments, the Trial Chamber may rely on independent indicia or on the lack of material 
disagreement between the accused and the Prosecution regarding the facts of the case.  
10  Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS:  A COMPARATIVE STUDY 113 (2003)  (citing art. 24(b) of the IMT Charter and art. 15(b) of the 
IMTFE Charter).  The guilty plea of Jean Kambanda (the Prime Minister of Rwanda at the time of the 
genocide) before the ICTR trends toward the traditional understanding of the pure guilty plea, insofar as 
Pr
e-P
rin
t
 
At the other end is the ‘charge bargain’ or, in the words of ICTY Rule 
62ter, the ‘plea agreement.’  Here, the defendant agrees to plead guilty to 
some of the charges in the indictment (or perhaps just one charge) in 
exchange for a variety of deliberately negotiated discounts.  These discounts 
range from the Prosecutor’s agreeing to drop certain other charges, to 
provide guarantees against self-incrimination, to commit not to use any 
evidence provided in legal proceedings against the defendant in the future, 
and to reduce sentence.  Not all plea agreements include all of these 
discounts: there is heterogeneity in the content of various agreements. In 
exchange, the Prosecution itself may bargain for the testimony of that 
defendant in proceedings involving other defendants, including high-profile 
defendants such as Slobodan Milosevic,11 although there is a moral hazard 
problem insofar as it may be difficult to judge ex ante the value, legitimacy, 
and credibility of the testimony.  In some plea agreements, the Prosecution 
commits to recommend a particular sentence or not to recommend a 
sentence beyond a certain level of severity.12 In other cases, the Prosecution 
agrees to a sentencing range and commits not to appeal any sentence 
imposed within that range (the defendant also may agree not to appeal any 
sentence within that range).13  In both of these situations (which, 
interestingly, have arisen under pleas entered under Rules 62bis and 62ter, 
which we discuss later), prosecutorial bargaining appears de facto to 
impinge on the power of the Trial Chamber to sentence, even though 
formally under Rule 62ter(B) the Trial Chamber is not bound by any 
agreement between the parties.  Once the Prosecutor begins to make these 
bargains, the incentive to bargain may be undercut if the Trial Chamber 
routinely refuses to honour the recommendations. The Trial Chamber may 
                                                                                                                                                 
Kambanda  pleaded guilty to all charges in the indictment (including genocide), acknowledged 
responsibility, and did not receive a reduced sentence (he was given life imprisonment). His subsequent 
attempts to appeal the sentence were unsuccessful. 
11  See e.g. Prosecutor v. Babić, Case No. IT-03-72-S (ICTY Trial Chamber, June 29, 2004) paras. 
65, 69, 73. 
12  See e.g. Prosecutor v. Jokić, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S (ICTY Trial Chamber, March 18, 2004) para. 
69 (plea agreement contains a commitment by the Prosecution to recommend a sentence of no more than 10 
years’ imprisonment; the Trial Chamber awarded a sentence of 7 years); Babić, para. 9 (plea agreement 
contains a stipulation that the Prosecution would recommend that the Trial Chamber impose a sentence of 
no more than 11 years). 
13  Prosecutor v. Češić, Case No. IT-95-10/1-S (ICTY Trial Chamber, March 11, 2004) para. 105; 
Prosecutor v. Obrenović, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S (ICTY Trial Chamber, December 10, 2003) para. 16, 147 
(plea agreement stipulates that the Prosecution will recommend that the Trial Chamber impose a sentence 
within the range of 15 to 20 years); Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Dosen, and Kolundžija, Case No. IT-95-8 (ICTY 
Trial Chamber, November 13, 2001) para. 29 (Prosecution and Defence agree that the Prosecution would 
recommend a range of five to seven years and that neither party would appeal any sentence imposed by the 
Trial Chamber within that range). 
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be sensitive to these incentives, with the result that Prosecutorial authority 
and discretion will increase. In practice, however, there have been a number 
of important cases where the Trial Chamber has refused to honour the 
sentencing recommendation in the plea agreement.14 
 
In short, the ICTY has gone well beyond the quintessential admission 
of guilt to enter into a framework of negotiated bargaining and, in this 
process, has legitimated a variety of exchanges.  The plea agreement, in 
particular the charge bargain, has elicited controversy. 
 
Our concern is that plea agreements remain an undertheorised element 
of the work of the ICTY despite the reality that they are increasingly 
becoming normalised – seemingly to further pragmatic ends – as official 
ICTY institutional policy.  What we hope to achieve in this article is to 
suggest theoretical frameworks in which plea agreements can be analysed 
and assessed, with a particular focus on the effects of plea bargaining on the 
expressed ideological, penological, and reconciliatory rationales of the 
ICTY. We come to these suggestions through a review of the positive law 
structure of plea bargaining in ICTY foundational documents, preceded by a 
discussion of some of the ICTY’s recent sentencing decisions involving 
plea-bargained convictions.  We also note the emergence of dissensus 
among ICTY judges regarding plea bargains, for example in the Deronjić 
and Momir Nikolić cases, and hope to structure some sort of conceptual 
framework in which this dissensus can be articulated or, at least, channeled.  
We also hope to flag certain areas of concern for the viability of plea 
bargains.  In particular, we worry about the extent to which the 
institutionalisation of plea agreements blocks the articulation of competing 
trial ideologies, in particular restorative approaches, while exaggerating the 
effects such negotiated agreements have on reconciliation and truth-telling. 
In both of these cases, the pragmatic justifications for plea bargains mask 
broader longer-term legitimacy concerns.  These concerns also are germane 
to the International Criminal Court (ICC) when it begins its work, and whose 
positive law of plea bargaining we also consider. 
  
 
A. Effects of Plea Bargains: Recent Cases 
 
                                                 
14  For example, in Babić the Trial Chamber imposed a sentence of 13 years despite plea agreement 
recommendation of no more than 11.  See also discussion infra note ____.  
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As of the fall of 2004, seventeen individuals indicted by the ICTY 
Prosecutor have entered guilty pleas.  33 cases have proceeded through full 
trial, leading to four acquittals and 29 convictions (some of which still 
remain subject to appeal).  The plea bargain therefore plays an important 
role in the praxis of the ICTY, securing over one-third of all convictions.  
 
What is more, plea bargains play some role in mitigating sentence,15 
although this may not be as decisive in the actual quantum of sentencing as 
critics of the plea bargain process may fear. Excluding the ICTY’s single life 
sentence,16  the mean and median sentences for those convicted following 
trial are 16.4 and 17 years respectively.17  Many of these sentences are under 
appeal   This is relevant insofar as the ICTY Appeals Chamber has been 
somewhat activist in terms of revisiting Trial Chambers sentences. For 
example, the two heaviest term sentences, 46 years to General Krstić and 45 
years to General Blaškić (both issued following conviction by trial), were 
subsequently reduced by the Appeals Chamber to 35 and 9 years 
respectively. The mean and median sentences for those who have entered 
guilty pleas are 13.8 and 11 years respectively.  Some of these plea 
bargained sentences also remain subject to appeal. 
 
There are, however, a number of important caveats to the ICTY data.  
First, included within the mean is the 40 year sentence to Goran Jelisić, who 
pleaded guilty to crimes against humanity and then went to trial on a single 
genocide charge, of which he was acquitted. This case is somewhat of an 
outlier,18 insofar as it constitutes the ICTY’s heaviest overall final term 
                                                 
15  Combs, supra note __, at 935. Plea bargains also mitigate sentence for defendants before other 
international criminal justice institutions. As for the ICTR, only three accused have pleaded guilty. This is a 
much more modest number than that found at the ICTY. That said, all of the ICTR’s lowest sentences have 
involved convictions secured through guilty pleas. Plea agreements or charge bargains have not yet been 
used at the ICTR. In terms of quantification of sentence, those who plead guilty in East Timor receive a 
significant discount.  In fact, the East Timor panels have shown a ‘markedly lenient approach’ to those who 
plead guilty, entitling these individuals to a material reduction of the sentence that would otherwise be 
imposed (cutting around half of the sentence).  Atolan, p. 7.  For this panel, remorse ‘is […] of minor 
importance[,] […] what matters is the practical […] cooperation with the prosecutor.’ Atolan, pp. 7-8. 
16  Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24 (ICTY Trial Chamber, July 31, 2003).  The sentence 
remains under appeal. 
17  Data compiled from Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings, available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/cases/factsheets/procfact-e.htm (Nov. 4, 2004).   
18  Jelisić is an early case (the second guilty plea entered before the ICTY), decided by the Trial 
Chamber orally on October 19, 1999 and in writing on December 14, 1999; the forty-year sentence was 
unanimously affirmed by the Appeals Chamber on July 5, 2001. Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Case No. IT-
95-10-A (ICTY Trial Chamber, December 14, 1999; ICTY Appeals Chamber, July 5, 2001).  In Jelisić, as 
was the case in Erdemović (the first guilty plea entered at the ICTY), the Prosecution did not bargain to 
obtain the plea.   Plea bargains began in earnest following the Todorović plea in December 2000. 
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sentence, and thereby may upwardly distort the mean plea- bargained 
sentence. The second longest plea-bargained sentence is 27 years to Momir 
Nikolić (which is currently under appeal). Second, and more important, is 
the reality that the extent to which the charge bargain affects overall 
sentencing data is extremely difficult to measure. Many of the individuals 
who pleaded guilty did so contingent on the dropping of other charges and 
often entered guilty pleas only to a handful of charges.  In many cases, at 
least three counts are dropped. These often include serious crimes against 
humanity charges (e.g. Banović, Mrdja, Momir Nikolić, Plavšić, Obrenović, 
Todorović, Milan Simić) and also war crimes charges (e.g. Babić, Jokić).  In 
particular, in three cases genocide charges were dropped as part of the plea 
(Momir Nikolić, Obrenović, Plavšić).  The ICTY’s one conviction on 
genocide (through trial and appeal following a not-guilty plea), which 
occurred only on a secondary liability theory of aiding and abetting 
genocide, resulted in a thirty-five year sentence. This is a much heavier 
sentence than that issued to any person convicted after a guilty plea other 
than Jelisić. To be sure, it may be that acquittals (or dismissals) would result 
were the bargained-away genocide charges actually to have gone to trial, as 
has been the case in the past.  That said, the phenomenon of charge 
bargaining makes it difficult to compare the sentencing data between 
offenders who plead guilty and offenders convicted pursuant to a trial.  We 
would hazard that a modeling calibration that factored in the effects of 
charge bargaining on the aggregate sentencing data would yield an 
expansion in the preexisting differences between the severity of punishment 
on the group of offenders who were convicted following a plea bargain and 
those convicted following a full trial.    
 
Furthermore, the declaratory value of plea bargains as mitigating 
factors in sentencing is robust. ICTY judges state clearly and frequently that 
guilty pleas are to be a significant factor in mitigating sentence.19  In 
Todorović, it was held that a guilty plea ‘should, in principle, give rise to a 
reduction in the sentence that the accused would otherwise have received;’20 
in Sikirica, the Trial Chamber cited the guilty plea as the ‘primary factor’ to 
be considered in mitigation of the defendant’s sentence;21 and in Plavšić, it 
                                                 
19  Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S (ICTY Trial Chamber, Feb. 27, 2003), para. 
110; Obrenović, para. 116 (guilty plea as a ‘significant factor in mitigation of the sentence’).  As for the 
justification of guilty pleas at the ICTR, see Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, ICTR-97-32-T (ICTR Trial Chamber, 
June 1, 2000), para. 53 (guilty pleas inter alia expedite proceedings and save resources).  
20  Todorović, para. 80. 
21   Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-S (ICTY Trial Chamber, November 13, 2001) para. 148. 
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was held proper to accord ‘significant weight’ to the guilty plea.22  In Mrdja, 
the Trial Chamber noted that the ICTY’s case-law has  
 
commonly accepted a guilty plea as a circumstance in mitigation of 
sentence for the following reasons:  a guilty plea may demonstrate 
honesty, helps to establish the truth, may contribute to peace-building 
and reconciliation, and saves the Tribunal the time and resources of a 
lengthy trial.  Moreover, victims and witnesses are relieved from the 
possible stress of testifying at trial.23  
 
In Mrdja, the Trial Chamber accepted that the plea helped establish 
the truth regarding the crimes committed on one day in one place and, ‘thus, 
in the long term, it may encourage reconciliation among the peoples of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.’24 This rationale is found in other recent plea 
bargain sentencing decisions, for example Jokić.25 The ICTY also has noted 
that a guilty plea process encourages accused persons to come forward.26 
Judicial economy concerns figure repeatedly in the ICTY’s endorsements of 
plea bargaining.27 
 
 (a) Plea Bargaining, Retribution, Predictability, and Discretion 
 
The pragmatic goals of plea bargaining are at odds with the goals of 
punishment affirmed by the ICTY.  The ICTY cites retribution, deterrence, 
and rehabilitation among the goals of the punishment it levies.  A review of 
the jurisprudence of the ICTY reveals that these goals are not co-equal and 
that primary importance is accorded to retribution.28  Paradoxically, 
however, plea bargains compete with the notion that perpetrators deserve to 
be punished.  For example, by punishing persons differently based on 
administrative contingencies, the ICTY moves away from punishing people 
differently based on the gravity of the crime or the level of their desert. 
Within the plea bargain framework, the bald reality is that perpetrators 
having information on others tend to be given a better bargain than those 
                                                 
22   Plavšić, para. 81. 
23  Prosecutor v. Mrdja, Case No. IT-02-59-S (ICTY Trial Chamber, March 31, 2004) para. 78).  
24  Mrdja, para. 79. 
25  Jokić, paras. 76-77. 
26   Prosecutor v. Banović, Case No. IT-02-65/1-S (ICTY Trial Chamber, October 28, 2003), paras. 
66, 68. 
27  See e.g. Sikirica para. 149 (noting that a guilty plea saves the international tribunal the time and 
effort of a lengthy investigation and trial).  
28  Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment:  The Criminality of Mass 
Atrocity, 99 NORTHWESTERN U. LAW REVIEW __, ___ (2005). 
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with nothing to offer.29  A perpetrator involved in a joint criminal enterprise 
with high-profile suspects may benefit greatly from the discount (especially 
if the cases against those high-profile suspects are weak) regardless of the 
egregiousness of the crimes committed.  These strategic concerns also 
weaken the deterrent function of punishment, insofar as sentencing becomes 
contingent on factors that have nothing to do with the perpetrator’s ability to 
encourage recidivism among others (general deterrence) or the perpetrator’s 
own propensity to re-offend (specific deterrence).  Moreover, the ICTY has 
held that guilty pleas are important insofar as they may protect victims from 
having to testify.30  This, of course, obfuscates the fact that, for some 
victims, testifying may have significant cathartic value, allowing them to 
engage with a broad spectrum of emotions and needs ranging from 
vengeance through to a fervent desire to make a personal contribution 
towards establishing what they regard as the ‘truth’.31 
 
In the end, a disjuncture emerges insofar as the administrative and 
bureaucratic factors that animate plea bargaining may run at cross-purposes 
to the rationales that have been adopted by the ICTY to justify the severity 
or leniency of punishment.  Although there is nothing improper per se in 
including new factors in the schema of punishment indicators, it is 
problematic to do so without amending the punishment rationales 
themselves.  To be sure, it could be argued that securing testimony and 
information through negotiated bargains may result in more convictions of 
individuals who would otherwise be acquitted or simply not indicted. This, 
in turn, augments overall retribution.  This argument, however, has not been 
articulated as a punishment rationale by the international criminal tribunals, 
for whom sentencing remains an individualised matter.   
  
 Retributive concerns arise not only when offenders who plea bargain 
are compared to offend rs who go to trial, but also when comparisons are 
made within the group of offenders who plea bargain. In fact, a retributivist 
would see little coherence in the sentences issued by the ICTY following 
plea bargains. Let us consider the following examples.  On the one hand, 
Biljana Plavšić, a top Bosnian Serb leader involved in the planning of some 
                                                 
29  Assuredly, these disparities also are found in municipal criminal law, in particular regarding the 
sentencing of drug offenders and criminal syndicates, where they have sparked critical commentary and 
concern. 
30  Todorović, paras. 89-92. 
31 Arguably, the rights of victims in this respect should be legally recognised; see Helen Fenwick 
Procedural Rights of Victims of Crime: Public or Private Ordering of the Criminal Justice Process 60 
MODERN LAW REVIEW (1997) 317. 
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of the gravest atrocities in Bosnia (forced expulsion of hundreds of 
thousands of non-Serbs, destruction of 850 non-Serb villages, killings of 
many thousands of individuals, widespread sexual assault, and inhumane 
destruction),32 was sentenced to 11 years.  This prompted ‘[v]ictims [to] 
react[] with predictable outrage,’ in particular when they learned that 
‘Plavšić was sent to serve her term in a posh Swedish prison that reportedly 
provides prisoners with use of a sauna, solarium, massage room, and horse-
riding paddock, among other amenities.’33  On the other hand, rebel Croatian 
Serb leader Milan Babić, much further down on the leadership hierarchy – 
and who agreed to testify against Slobodan Milošević – received a sentence 
of 13 years for his role in a campaign to expel non-Serbs.  The 13 years’ 
imprisonment issued to Babić surpassed the 11 years recommended by the 
Prosecution, whereas the 11 years imposed on Plavšić was far below the 
Prosecutor’s recommendation of between 15 and 25 years. 
 
Plavšić’s sentence is only four years longer than that issued to 
Miodrag Jokić, who pleaded guilty to war crimes charges related to the 
shelling of Dubrovnik involving the destruction of cultural property and the 
deaths of two civilians and the wounding of three others.  Moreover, 
Plavšić’s sentence is 16 years shorter than that of Momir Nikolić, a security 
and intelligence officer of much more modest status who was charged in 
connection with Srebrenica but was not involved in the wider Serb assaults 
throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Whereas Darko Mrdja was sentenced 
to 17 years after pleading guilty to direct involvement in the shooting of 200 
persons (only 12 of whom survived), Ranko Češić, a Bosnian Serb police 
reservist, was sentenced to 18 years for pleading guilty to beating to death 
ten prisoners and sexually assaulting (in especially gruesome fashion) two 
others.   Češić’s punishment contrasts with the 10 year sentence imposed on 
Miroslav Deronjić, an influential civilian leader who substantially 
participated in a joint criminal enterprise that ordered the razing of the 
village of Glogova, in which 64 Bosnian Muslims civilians were killed and 
many more forcibly displaced. 
 
To be sure, it is difficult to compare atrocious crimes through the use 
of indicators of gravity focused on numbers of victims.  That said, the scope 
of the crime is an important indicator of gravity.  So, too, is the position of 
the accused in the leadership hierarchy, insofar as senior status suggests the 
                                                 
32  Plavšić, paras. 16, 42. 
33  See Combs, supra note __, at 936.   
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power to have blocked or ignored the administrative orders that serve as the 
starting point of mass violence. A review of plea bargained cases, however, 
suggests that these retributive rationales do not inform sentencing in a 
predictable manner and that intervening strategic rationales regarding plea 
negotiations may be a cause of this lack of predictability.  The fact that 
bureaucratic constraints and managerial dictates now affect the fate of many 
‘enemies of all humankind’ weakens the ICTY’s retributive authority.  What 
is more, if a purpose of retribution might be for individual victims to see 
punishment inflicted on the criminal, victims should play a role in 
determining whether or not a plea should be accepted and on which terms.34  
In the end, although this variability in terms of plea bargained sentences 
could be lauded as the individualisation of sentencing, the lack of an 
ordering heuristic suggests a more troubling absence of predictability that 
erodes the retributive value of punishment, along with secondary rationales 
such as deterrence, expressivism, and rehabilitation.  
 
That said, the purpose of this exercise is not to propound the merits of 
retributive approaches. In fact, we share deep concerns over such 
approaches, both within municipal criminal law as well as international 
criminal law. The purpose, instead, is to flag our concerns with judicialised 
governance systems that claim a certain punishment ideology but then utilise 
indicators to enforce that ideology that are inconsistent, disconnected, and 
unpredictable.   
  
 
 (b) Plea Bargains and the Systematisation of Mitigation in Sentencing  
 
The jurisprudence evidences a paucity of clear principles as to how 
pleading guilty intersects with other mitigating factors, leading to the 
phenomenon of what w  identify as a praxis of cumulative mitigation. More 
specifically, once an offender plea bargains, does that automatically entitle 
the offender to a broader number of additional mitigating discounts because 
that offender then also can claim acceptance of responsibility, substantial 
cooperation with prosecution, remorse, and voluntary surrender?   
 
The jurisprudence is somewhat fragmented. In the Češić case, the 
prosecution ‘did aver that mitigation for remorse is separate to and distinct 
                                                 
34  The ICC Rules permit some victim involvement in the evaluation of an admission of guilt.  See 
ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/php/show.php?id=rules, Rule 
139. 
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from mitigation arising from a guilty plea.’35 On the other hand, in Plavšić, 
the judges held that the remorse was ‘part of the mitigating circumstances 
connected with a guilty plea’ insofar as it was arguable that by the plea the 
defendant already had demonstrated remorse.36  In Jelisić, the plea had 
limited effect in mitigation because the Trial Chamber felt the expression of 
remorse was not sincere37 and that the cooperation was not compelling.38  
The Jelisić approach is more similar to that in Češić in the sense that these 
closely related factors are viewed separately and, in Jelisić’s unusual case, in 
tension with each other. Differentiating the guilty plea from remorse and co-
operation as independent factors in mitigation (despite their close 
connection) serves the benefit of discounting overall mitigation in cases 
where the co-operation over time may prove to be duplicitous.  For example, 
the Trial Chamber found Momir Nikolić’s subsequent testimony to be 
evasive and previous statements to have been false.39 It thereby separately 
mitigated his sentence because of the plea but not because of cooperation, 
instead of discounting the overall value of the plea bargain as an element in 
mitigation.  In the end, though, it seems odd to accept a guilty plea when 
there is no remorse or cooperation: the retributive, expressive, and narrative 
effects of such a plea seem thin.  The managerial aspects would be the only 
benefit that remains, thereby giving rise to the concerns regarding the 
influence of pragmatics on ICTY penology that we explore in Part C.(a) 
below. 
 
That said, there does appear to be a practice of cumulative mitigation. 
This is found not only at the ICTY, but also in the work of other 
                                                 
35   Češić, para. 65. Remorse was dealt with as a separate mitigating factor in Todorović, unconnected 
with rationales which might justify the guilty plea discount. Todorović, paras 89-92, 114. The Trial 
Chamber accepted the defendant’s remorse as genuine, and appeared particularly impressed by his 
expressed desire to ‘channel his remorse into positive action to reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 
although this was expressed more by way of sentiment than intended action on the part of the defendant. Id. 
paras. 90 and 91. More generally, it is worth noting that the doctrinal basis for treating remorse as a 
mitigating factor has been challenged; see M Bagaric and K Amarasekara Feeling Sorry? – Tell Someone 
who Cares: The Irrelevance of Remorse in Sentencing, 40 HOWARD JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE (2001) 364. 
36  Plavšić, para. 73. 
37  Jelisić Trial Judgement, para. 127 (affirmed on appeal).  
38  Jelisić Appeal judgement, para. 125. See also Jelisić Appeal Judgement, para. 121 (according 
considerable discretion to the Trial Chamber in terms of weighing the value of a guilty plea by holding that 
‘[t]he Statute and Rules leave it open to the Trial Chamber to consider the mitigating effect of a guilty plea 
on the basis that the mitigating weight to be attached to the plea lies in the discretion of the Trial 
Chamber.’) 
39   Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S (ICTY Trial Chamber, December 2, 2003) 
para. 156). 
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international criminal justice institutions.40 By way of example, mitigating 
factors in Deronjić’s sentence included the guilty plea,41 the acceptance of 
responsibility,42 cooperation with the prosecution43 and remorse.44   In the 
Mrdja case, cooperation with prosecution,45 guilty plea,46 and remorse47 
were considered synergistically; in Jokić, mitigating factors included 
voluntary surrender,48 guilty plea and acceptance of responsibility,49 
remorse,50 and cooperation with the prosecution;51 and in Češić the 
mitigating factors were the guilty plea,52 cooperation with the prosecution,53 
and remorse.54  What is more, in Mrdja, ‘[t]he Prosecution did not challenge 
the claim that an accused’s remorse is a potential factor in mitigation and 
that it is independent of other circumstances, such as a guilty plea.’55  Mrdja 
also demonstrates that the Trial Chamber can consider cooperation with the 
Prosecution as an independent mitigating factor, even though cooperation 
was an explicit term of the guilty plea negotiated between the defendant and 
Prosecution.  Accordingly, the Trial Chamber credited Mrdja for cooperation 
when that cooperation already was a central commitment of another factor 
cited in mitigation, namely the guilty plea agreement.56  A similar 
phenomenon emerges in the Jokić sentencing decision, in which the 
defendant is lauded for his full and substantial cooperation with the 
Prosecution even though that cooperation was an explicit term of the plea 
agreement in which the Prosecution already had committed not to ask for 
more than a ten year sentence (along with a number of other concessions).57  
                                                 
40  In Atolan, the East Timor Special Panel held that the plea was ‘the most important and only 
relevant of the mitigating elements,’ but then went on to discuss remorse (of minor importance) and 
cooperation with the prosecution (found to be something that matters).  Atolan, pp 7-8.  Therefore, 
although the East Timorese approach in this decision serves to assess the plea as an independent and free 
standing factor to which the expression of remorse as contained within the plea is inconsequential, it was 
not prepared to view cooperation with the prosecution, also part of the plea, in the same way. 
41   Deronjić, para. 277. 
42   Id.   
43   Id. para. 278. 
44   Id. para. 263-64. 
45   Mrdja, paras. 74, 110. 
46   Id.  para. 77 (even if the plea is delayed) 
47   Id. para. 110. 
48  Jokić, para. 73. 
49   Id. para. 78 (explicitly considered these together). 
50   Id. para. 92. 
51  Id. para. 96. 
52   Češić, para. 60. 
53   Id. para. 62. 
54   Id. para. 66. 
55  Mrdja, para. 84. 
56   Id. paras. 71-74, 100. 
57   Jokić, para. 95. 
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As we explore in Part B below, the concerns that arise in the jurisprudence 
regarding the intersection of the guilty plea with other mitigating factors in 
sentencing are at least in part traceable to the indeterminate language of the 
ICTY’s positive law instruments.  
 
 
 (c) Plea Bargaining and the Interface between International and 
National Courts 
 
 What is the effect of charge bargaining at the international tribunals 
on the coincident or subsequent pursuit of charges by national or local 
courts? In other words, if a genocide charge is dropped by the ICTY as part 
of a negotiated plea agreement, does this preclude a national court properly 
exercising jurisdiction (whether based on territoriality, nationality, or 
universality) from pursuing that same genocide charge? In the event rules of 
understanding are not developed between international and national courts in 
an era where administrative pressures are prompting the international 
tribunals increasingly to consider referring cases to the national level, the 
incentive structure behind plea bargains may become threatened, for better 
or for worse. This also presents the problematic of disjointed proceedings at 
various levels against the same defendant for similar or related acts.  
Although, on the one hand, there is some merit in enforcing international 
criminal law through a myriad of diffuse institutions, on the other hand 
principles of judicial economy, stability, and precedent suggest the need to 
craft certain rules of understanding. Looking beyond administrative 
incentives, however, we note that formulating understandings will be 
essential if general principles of international criminal law, such as non bis 
in idem, are to be respected.  Another important principle is the notion that 
there is a duty to prosecute certain extraordinary international crimes, such 
as genocide. 
 
These concerns relate not only to the bringing of charges in national 
courts, but also the kind of evidence that can be adduced.  The ICTY 
Prosecutor has agreed not to use evidence obtained from a defendant who 
plea bargains against that defendant before the ICTY. But can such 
guarantees bind national courts with jurisdiction, to which the ICTY 
increasingly is turning to discharge its workload? 
 
 
(d) An Emerging Dissensus? 
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The ICTY has begun to voice some reserve regarding the general 
suitability of plea bargaining to international crimes and the legitimacy of 
certain individual plea agreements. This inchoate dissensus emerges tellingly 
in the Momir Nikolić decision, as well as both the majority and dissent in the 
Deronjić case.58 As discussed previously, Miroslav Deronjić was sentenced 
to 10 years for his role in the Glogova massacre.59  The Trial Chamber 
majority noted that the plea agreement in question was of the charge 
bargaining variety permitted under Rule 62ter.  It noted that these sorts of 
bargains limited the factual record to that in the agreement itself and, what is 
more, suggested that an accused may confess ‘only because of the principle 
‘do ut des’ (give and take).’60  The judges suggested that it was appropriate 
to analyse why an accused entered a guilty plea, specifically citing factors 
such as the withdrawal of charges or the issuance of sentence 
recommendation,61 but then ended up affirming the agreement in its entirety 
even though it was quite arguable that the Deronijic agreement on its face 
was one of do ut des.  Although the Trial Chamber ruminated about the 
suitability of plea bargains for situations of mass atrocity – noting that in 
most municipal jurisdictions plea bargains did not apply to very serious 
crimes and did not affect the maximum statutory penalty – it ultimately 
accepted the plea bargain, including the ten year sentence recommended by 
the Prosecutor.62 It was motivated in this regard by what it saw as the greater 
need for truth-telling and reconciliation in the context of the work of the 
international tribunals than in the work of national legal systems.63  We 
                                                 
58  The decision of the Trial Chamber was authored by Judge Agius, to which Judge Mumba agreed 
in a separate opinion. 
59  The sentence derived from the guilty plea, Deronjić’s provision of evidence in five other ICTY 
trials, and his expression of remorse and responsibility. In addition, the ICTY Trial Chamber noted that 
Deronjić’s confession and admission of all the factual details in the indictment (the second amended 
indictment, to be precise) ‘has guided the international community closer to the truth on crimes committed 
in the area of Glogova, truth being one prerequisite to peace. He has helped, to a certain extent, to protect 
against any kind of revisionism.’ Deronjić, para. 3.  That said, this amended indictment was reduced to one 
charge (persecution as a crime against humanity) down from six counts in the first indictment. Deronjić, 
paras. 14, 18. 
60  Id. para. 135; this is not the first time the principle of do ut des surfaces in the sentencing 
jurisprudence of the ICTY, insofar as it was referenced in Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-
S (ICTY Trial Chamber, December 18, 2003) para. 122. 
61   Deronjić, para. 135. 
62  Deronjić, paras. 135, 230, 280. See also dissenting judgement para. 14(b) (noting that in the 
majority of surveyed countries ‘a guilty plea is given only little – if any – weight in relation to serious 
crimes.  In Australia, Canada, China, England, and Germany, first degree murder attracts a mandatory 
sentence of life imprisonment that can not be altered by the acceptance of the guilty plea or confession of 
the accused.’)   
63   Deronjić, para 236. 
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examine this justification, as well as the truth-telling and reconciliatory 
effects of plea bargains, in greater detail in Part C below.  
 
Judge Schomburg dissented on sentence, concluding that Deronjić 
deserved a term of imprisonment of at least twenty years.  He remarked that 
the ten year sentence was not proportional to the crimes in the agreement.64  
In addition, Judge Schomburg expressed concern that the crimes pleaded 
were ‘arbitrarily’ presented from the context of a much larger criminal 
plan.65  Concern also was raised that Deronjić had admitted in his testimony 
that he had committed other crimes for which no indictments were issued. 
 
The Momir Nikolić sentencing judgement, rendered on December 2, 
2003, preceded Deronjić. In this sentencing judgement, the ICTY gave 
extensive critical thought to the plea agreement, in particular charge 
bargaining, which it urged should be treated with extreme caution given the 
Prosecutor’s duty to prosecute serious violations of international 
humanitarian law.66  Nikolić’s plea was for one count of persecutions as a 
crime against humanity and the remaining counts were dismissed, including 
a genocide charge.  In its sentencing judgement, the ICTY was concerned 
with the extent of Nikolić’s cooperation with the Prosecution, in particular 
the credibility and truthfulness of his testimony in other cases.67 
Furthermore, the ICTY evinced a certain level of skepticism towards the 
‘negotiation’ that effectively precedes many plea agreements.68 The Trial 
Chamber emphasised that it ‘may’ enter a finding of guilt based on the plea 
agreement as it has the discretion whether to accept the plea, noting also that 
                                                 
64   Deronjić dissenting judgement, para. 2. 
65  Id. para. 4. 
66  Momir Nikolić, para. 65. The background to the Momir Nikolić plea is somewhat complicated. 
Initially, on May 6, 2003, an ICTY Trial Chamber composed entirely of judges from civil law systems had 
rejected a plea agreement conducted between the Prosecution and Nikolić because, inter alia, the 
Prosecutor had not agreed to dismiss the remaining charges until the time of sentencing.  Momir Nikolić, 
para. 11. The essentially overturned agreement had stipulated the accused would confess to charges that 
included crimes against humanity and testify on behalf of the Prosecution in other cases regarding the 
Srebrenica massacre. In return, the prosecution agreed to dismiss genocide charges (and certain war crimes 
charges) and committed to request a reduced sentence due inter alia to the dismissal of the genocide 
charges.  When called upon to validate this plea agreement, the Trial Chamber judges became hesitant.  As 
Knoops observes, ‘the agreement was unclear as to whether the prosecutor was empowered to prosecute the 
accused for the genocide charge in the event his confession would be found inadmissible, i.e. not equivocal 
and/or voluntary.’  Knoops, supra note ___, at p. 115. Once this was remedied, the Trial Chambers 
accepted the plea agreement and reserved its judgement as to sentence.  Under the terms of the plea 
agreement that was accepted, Nikolić agreed to cooperate with the Prosecution, provide truthful 
information, testify in the trial of a former co-accused and any other trial as requested, and not to appeal the 
sentence unless this is set outside the agreed upon range (15 to 20 years).  Momir Nikolić, para. 17. 
67  Momir Nikolić, para. 25. 
68   Id. para. 48. 
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it ‘may also reject a particular guilty plea based on a plea agreement because 
it does not consider that the plea agreement is in the interests of justice.’69  
In a prescient observation germane to the theoretical independence o
international criminal law, the Trial Chamber noted that there are important 
differences between national criminal justice systems that prosecute ordinary 
crimes and international systems that prosecute those who flout international 
humanitarian law. These differences suggest that transplanting plea 
bargaining frameworks from national courts to the ICTY (and other 
international criminal tribunals) should be viewed cautiously. In addition, 
the Trial Chamber made a number of conceptual critiques of plea bargains 
for extraordinary international crimes: 
f 
                                                
 
Convictions entered by a trial chamber must accurately reflect the 
actual conduct and crime committed and must not simply reflect the 
agreement of the parties as to what would be a suitable settlement of 
the matter. […] The Trial Chamber notes that the savings of time and 
resources due to a guilty plea has often been considered as a valuable 
and justifiable reason for the promotion of guilty pleas.  This Trial 
Chamber cannot fully endorse this argument. While it appreciates this 
saving of Tribunal resources, the Trial Chamber finds that in cases of 
this magnitude, where the Tribunal has been entrusted by the United 
Nations Security Council – and by extension, the international 
community as a whole – to bring justice to the former Yugoslavia 
through criminal proceedings that are fair, in accordance with 
international human rights standards, and accord due regard to the 
rights of the accused and the interests of victims, the savings of 
resources cannot be given undue consideration or importance. The 
quality of justice and the fulfillment of the mandate of the Tribunal, 
including the establishment of a complete and accurate record of the 
crimes committ d in the former Yugoslavia, must not be 
compromised.70  
 
We salute the critical perspective adumbrated here by the Trial 
Chamber. Although intangible, we would agree that there is a qualitative 
element to justice that transcends bureaucratic management concerns and 
raw number of convictions.  
 
69  Id. para. 54. 
70  Id. paras. 65, 67. On the other hand, the Trial Chamber also pointed out its perceptions regarding 
the benefits of plea bargaining. Id. paras. 68-72. These benefits correspond to those that redound 
throughout the entire jurisprudence of the ICTY and that we have discussed earlier. 
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In the end, in issuing sentence the Trial Chamber departed from the 
plea agreement. Under the agreement, the Prosecutor had recommended a 
sentence between 15 and 20 years, the defence a sentence of 10 years, and 
Nikolić explicitly had waived his right to appeal any sentence within the 
agreed-to range.71  The Trial Chamber concluded that the agreed-to range 
was inadequate and sentenced Nikolić to 27 years, noting that he had a right 
to appeal this sentence.  
  
That said, it is disappointing that the concerns raised in the Nikolić 
case only affected the quantum of sentence in a seemingly ad hoc fashion. 
The ICTY did not establish a framework for when it should disregard the 
Prosecutor’s recommendation, citing only its power to do so and, thereby, 
added an additional level of indeterminate discretion to the sentencing 
process.  In fact, it contrasted its positive law framework with that of 
national courts and noted that in many national jurisdictions particular 
charges are accompanied with mandatory sentencing ranges. This means that 
national prosecutors can transparently impact sentence by deciding which 
charges to agree to in a plea.72  At the ICTY, there are no minimum or 
maximum sentencing ranges that attach to any crime. The ICTY took this to 
buttress its understanding as to its discretionary authority in sentencing, 
including the legitimacy of deviating from the ranges recommended in the 
plea agreement.73 
 
Moreover, although the Deronjić opinion is dotted with concerns 
regarding plea bargaining (many of these drawing directly from the Momir 
Nikolić opinion), these concerns had no material effect in terms of the 
majority’s disposition and punishment.  In fact, many plea agreements 
considered by the ICTY following Momir Nikolić have not received any 
critical assessment at all.74 In the end, despite the emergent dissensus, the 
fact remains the Trial Chambers have affirmed most of the plea bargains and 
plea agreements (and the recommended sentencing ranges) that have come 
before them.   
                                                 
71   Id. paras. 172, 173. 
72   Id. para. 56. 
73   Id. 
74  One exception is Dragan Nikolić. In this case, the defendant and Prosecution entered a plea 
agreement in which the defendant pleaded guilty and the Prosecutor recommended a sentence of 15 years.  
The ICTY, citing similar concerns to those it had raised in Momir Nikolić, and also citing the brutality and 
gravity of the crimes, instead imposed a sentence of 23 years.  Another exception is Babić, where the Trial 
Chamber imposed a sentence of 13 years despite plea agreement recommendation of no more than 11. 
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B. Guilty Pleas and the ICTY’s Positive Law Instruments  
 
We now  provide some additional textual discussion of how guilty 
pleas are conceptualised within the foundation documentation of the 
ICTY,75 drawing comparisons with the more recent approach of the ICC. 
                                                
 
      As noted earlier, reference to guilty pleas appears in the ICTY’s 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 62 bis which states that: 
 
If an accused pleads guilty in accordance with Rule 62 (vi), or 
requests to change his or her plea to guilty and the Trial Chamber is 
satisfied that: 
 
(i) the guilty plea has been made voluntarily; 
 
(ii) the guilty plea is informed; 
 
(iii) the guilty plea is not equivocal; and 
 
(iv) there is a sufficient factual basis for the crime and the 
accused’s participation in it, either on the basis of independent 
indicia or on lack of any material disagreement between the 
parties about the facts of the case, 
 
the Trial Chamber may enter a finding of guilt and instruct the 
Registrar to set a date for the sentencing hearing. 
 
The Appeals Chamber in Erdemović76 held that for a plea to be 
regarded as voluntary the accused must be mentally capable of 
comprehending the consequences of pleading guilty without any threats, 
inducements or promises. The fact that guilty pleas must be informed 
reflects the finding of the Appeals Chamber in Erdemović77 that the accused 
 
75  The foundational documents of the ICTR are virtually identical in this respect, except that Rule 
62(B)(i) adds the word ‘freely’ to ‘voluntarily’ and the reference in Rule 62(B)(iv) is changed from 
‘independent’ to ‘objective’ indicia.  
76  Prosecutor v. Erdemović (Case No. IT-96-22-A), October 7, 1997, Joint Separate Opinion of 
Judge McDonald and Judge Vorah, at para. 10. 
77  Ibid., at para., 75. 
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in that case had not originally understood the nature of the charges or the 
consequences of pleading guilty to them.78 
 
There was initially no reference or discussion in the ICTY’s Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence regarding the effect of any plea agreement made 
between the Prosecutor and the Defence on the accused’s behalf. The Trial 
Chamber in Erdemović79 was the first to take a plea agreement into account 
when determining sentence, making clear that such agreements should be 
concluded on the initiative of the parties without any contribution or 
encouragement from the Trial Chamber. It was also unequivocal in stating 
that plea agreements should be in no way binding upon the Trial Chamber. 
In consequence, Rule 62 ter was adopted into the ICTY’s Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence on December 13, 2001. This provides:   
 
(A) The Prosecutor and the defence may agree that, upon the 
accused entering a plea of guilty to the indictment or to one or 
more counts of the indictment, the Prosecutor shall do one or more 
of the following before the Trial Chamber: 
 
(i) apply to amend the indictment accordingly;  
 
(ii) submit that a specific sentence or sentencing range is 
appropriate;  
 
(iii) not oppose a request by the accused for a particular 
sentence or sentencing range. 
 
(B) The Trial Chamber shall not be bound by any agreement 
specified in paragraph (A). 
 
(C) If a plea agreement has been reached by the parties, the Trial 
Chamber shall require the disclosure of the agreement in open session 
or, on a showing of good cause, in closed session, at the time the 
accused pleads guilty in accordance with Rule 62 (vi), or requests to 
change his or her plea to guilty 
 
                                                 
78  The case was subsequently remitted to a second Trial Chamber so that the accused could make an 
informed plea.  
79  Prosecutor v. Erdemović (Case No. IT-96-22), Sentencing Judgement, March 5, 1998, at para. 19 
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The relationship between Rule 62 bis and Rule 62 ter is clear to the extent 
that any plea agreement may be taken as sufficient indication that there is a 
sufficient factual basis for the crime and the accused’s participation in it. 
However, Rule 62 bis contains nothing to indicate what the consequences of 
entering or changing a plea to guilty should be in terms of its impact on the 
determination and length of sentence, whether that plea is the subject of a 
plea agreement or not. Certainly, no possibility of a ‘plea bargain’ is 
canvassed in the Rules of Evidence and Procedure in the sense of any 
guaranteed discount resulting from a change of plea depending on the stage 
at which it is entered.80 As with the decision to accept a plea, the effect of its 
timing is left to the discretion of the judges in the Trial Chamber. The Trial 
Chamber in Todorović81 suggested that the public advantage to be derived 
from the Tribunal’s truth-finding function would only be served if pleas 
entered before the commencement of the trial were rewarded with the full 
appropriate82 discount. These comments were subsequently endorsed by the 
Trial Chamber in the Sikirica case where the accused failed to receive full 
credit because of the lateness of his plea.83 
      
                                                 
80  Such a possibility was mooted in England and Wales by the Auld Report, Review of the Criminal 
Courts (London: Lord Chancellor’s Department, Sept. 2001). 
81  Todorović, para.31. 
82  See also Češić, para. 59 (noting that pleas concluded early in the process, especially if entered 
before trial, are particularly favourable).  What counts as appropriate is, of course, a matter for conjecture. 
In England and Wales, for example, a one-third discount for a timely plea has conventionally been the 
norm for an early plea. Suggested guidelines recently issued by the Sentencing Guidelines Council offer a 
graduated scale ranging from one-third where the plea is entered at the first reasonable opportunity to less 
than one-tenth where it is entered after the trial has begun. The crucial variable is the offender’s willingness 
to admit guilt so that in exceptional circumstances it is suggested a reduction of greater than one-third 
might be appropriate for ‘a particularly early admission of guilt, or where absolute candour is demonstrated 
by an offender, or where the offender admits a crime that was either unknown to the authorities or in 
relation to which there was no evidence against him.’; Sentencing Guidelines Council, Draft Guideline-1: 
Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea, August 2004, at page 5, available online at http://www.sentencing-
guidelines.gov.uk/draftguidelines/guiltypleas/foreword.html. Jorgensen cites a report suggesting that the 
Prosecutor in Erdemović advocated a sentence discount of between 50 and 75 per cent for an accused who 
pleaded guilty and cooperated with the Prosecution; N. H. B. Jorgensen, The Genocide Acquittal in the 
Sikirica Case Before the International Criminal Tribunal for The Former Yugoslavia and the Coming of 
Age of the Guilty Plea, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 389 (2002), at p. 401, footnote 76. 
83  A significant argument discussed by Jorgensen concerned the Defence contention in Sikirica that 
the full extent of the accused’s personal culpability in terms of his role at the Keraterm camp could only 
have been revealed by delaying his guilty plea until after the conclusion of both the prosecution and 
defence evidence and that substantial credit should still have been given for it. Jorgensen, supra note ___. 
Given that the Prosecutor would not have accepted a plea to charges of persecution prior to the 
commencement of the case, nor while genocide charges were pending, the Defence argued that the plea 
eventually entered by the accused should have been treated as one made at the outset but on the basis of the 
actual factual basis revealed during the course of the trial. This argument was rejected by the Trial 
Chamber.  
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The ICTY Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide a 
fairly minimalist framework for the practice of sentencing and its principled 
development. Article 24 of the ICTY Statute provides (inter alia) that the 
Trial Chamber should take into account such factors as the gravity of the 
offence and the individual circumstances of the convicted person. In addition 
to setting the maximum term upon conviction to life imprisonment,84 Rule 
101 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence also provides (inter alia) 
that the Trial Chamber shall take into account any aggravating 
circumstances and any mitigating circumstances, including the substantial 
cooperation with the Prosecutor by the convicted person before or after 
conviction; and the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts 
of the Former Yugoslavia.  
 
Because judges in the ICTY have been left with a largely unfettered 
sentencing discretion under the terms of its foundation instruments, Trial 
Chambers have increasingly adopted an individualised approach to 
sentencing.85 For various reasons, but especially due to its reluctance to 
categorise the crimes listed in the ICTY Statute in terms of their gravity, the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber has refused to be drawn towards the development 
of a definitive list of sentencing factors or a common approach to sentencing 
particular categories of crime.86 Accordingly, sentences in the ICTY are 
largely determined on an individualised basis, taking account of the gravity 
of the offence87 and the degree of responsibility of the accused, together 
with the impact of relevant aggravating circumstances. Although ICTY 
judges have access to a broad range of information to assist them in 
achieving their objectives,88 the weight to be accorded to the evidence 
                                                 
84  See further, W. Schabas, Sentencing and the International Tribunals: For a Human Rights 
Approach, 7 DUKE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 461 (1997) available online at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/djcil/articles/djcil7p461.htm  
85  This is facilitated by the fact that, in practice, the ICTY regards the sentencing practice in the 
courts of the Former Yugoslavia as merely indicative of the approach to be taken in any particular case. 
86  The general approach of the ICTY is to be found in the Čelebići Appeals Judgement of February 
20, 2001; see Prosecutor v Delalić et al. (Case No. IT-96-21), Appeals Chamber, Judgement, February 20, 
2001, at paras. 710-724. The following contains the most significant passage: ‘The Appeals Chamber 
accordingly concludes that it is inappropriate for it to attempt to list exhaustively the factors that it finds 
should be taken into account by a Trial Chamber in determining sentence.The sentencing provisions in the 
Statute and the Rules provide Trial Chambers with the discretion to take into account the circumstances of 
each crime in assessing the sentence to be given.’ 
87  See further, M. Frulli, Are Crimes against Humanity More Serious than War Crimes?’ 12 
EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 329 (2001);  A. Carcano Sentencing and the Gravity of the Offence in 
International Criminal Law, 51 INT’L & COMP. L. QUARTERLY, 583 (2002). 
88  For example, Rule 85(A)(vi) of the ICTY Rules provides that the parties may produce ‘any 
relevant information that may assist the Trial Chamber in determining an appropriate sentence if the 
accused is found guilty on one or more of the charges in the indictment.’ 
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therefore continues to depend on judicial discretion exercised according to
the circumstances of eac 89
 
h individual case.   
                                                
 
The failure of the ICTYs foundation instruments to suggest how 
particular sentencing factors might be balanced within the context of 
different sentencing purposes for each category of crime is a serious 
omission for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the absence of any guidance 
regarding how to operationalise different ideologies for punishment makes it 
easier for the predominantly retributive dynamic of the ICTY penality to 
prevail. Secondly, and in consequence, the potential for the sentencing 
process to contribute towards the achievement of legitimate goals for victims 
and post-conflict societies is reduced considerably. Finally, and of special 
significance for the present discussion, the absence of a rational and 
principled approach to reconciling competing claims for justice and over-
reliance on individualism and unfetterred discretionary power means that 
there is no institutional resistance to the control ideology of plea bargaining. 
It is for this reason that the weak ideological and normative structures of trial 
justice in the ICTY currently facilitate the exponential growth of plea 
agreements. 
  
In similar vein to the ICTY, the ICC Statute (Article 65) provides that, 
where the accused admits guilt under Article 64.8.(a), the Trial Chamber 
must satisfy itself as to the voluntariness of the admission, that the accused 
understands the consequences, and that the admission is supported by the 
charges and factual evidence then available to it.90 Article 65.3. goes on to 
 
89  In his recent detailed analysis of the sentencing practices of the ad hoc tribunals, Beresford 
identified the following main aggravating factors as commonly taken into account: the scope of the crime; 
number and suffering of the victims; form of participation; motive; superior responsibility. Mitigating 
circumstances included: the plea of guilty; personal circumstances (emotional condition of the accused, 
background of the accused, effect of sentence on others where unusual hardship likely to result, conduct of 
the accused since the commission of the offence); good character; superior orders; level of participation in 
the crimes; disorder ensuing from an armed conflict; S. Beresford Unshackling the Paper Tiger: The 
Sentencing Practices of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, 1 INT’L CRIM. L. R. 33 (2002)  
90  For further detail see, H-J Behrens Investigation, Trial and Appeal in the International Criminal 
Court Statute (Parts V, VI, VIII) 6 EURO. J. CRIME, CRIM. L., & CRIM. J. 429 (1998). Schabas supports 
the view that the ICC Statute achieves an acceptable pragmatic compromise in reconciling the opposing 
philosophical approaches to the concept of the guilty plea characteristic of common law and civil law 
jurisdictions W. Schabas  An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2nd  ed, 2004) at page 150. It is worth noting that in England and Wales, when the 
offender pleads guilty the judge does not hear the evidence, only the prosecution’s statement of facts. 
Disagreements relating to the factual basis for sentencing may be resolved by a ‘Newton hearing.’ For 
further discussion see, A. Ashworth  Sentencing and Criminal Justice (London: Butterworths, 2000) at 
pages 308-311. The ICC Statute (Article 65.4.) goes further than this in providing that the Trial Chamber 
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state that, if the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that that these conditions are 
established, it may deem the guilty plea as not having been made and 
proceed to trial. The presumption of innocence is enshrined in Article 66, 
which also confirms that the onus is on the prosecution to prove to the 
satisfaction of the Court that the accused is guilty beyond all reasonable 
doubt.  
 
The negotiations which preceded the formulation of the rules for the 
acceptance of guilty pleas in the ICC Statute were notable for the apparent 
misconception and suspicion on the part of civil law countries regarding the 
nature, effect and consequences of a guilty plea as commonly understood in 
common law jurisdictions.91 However, as Behrens92 points out, whilst the 
original ILC Draft93 was treated with circumspection since it failed to 
specify the consequences of a guilty plea, detailed comparisons of the 
criteria applied by judges in both trial styles in the sessions of the 
Preparatory Committee revealed remarkable similarities – particularly as 
regards judicial checks on whether the plea was made voluntarily and in full 
knowledge of the consequences. Thus, the debate as to whether the 
procedure should be termed ‘a guilty plea’, ‘confession of guilt’, or, 
‘admission of guilt’ became superfluous, as is the provision eventually 
added to the ICC Statute (Article 65(5)), which states: 
 
            Any discussions between the Prosecutor and the defence regarding 
modification of    
             the charges, the admission of guilt or the penalty to be imposed shall 
not be binding  
             on the Court.94 
 
However, the ICC Statute and the Rules of Evidence and Procedure are 
correspondingly silent r garding the impact of a guilty plea on sentence. For 
                                                                                                                                                 
may request the Prosecutor to present additional evidence (including witness testimony) in order to satisfy 
itself that a more complete presentation is made in the interests of justice. 
91  See Behrens, supra, note 17.  But see discussion infra text at note 133, in which convergences 
between common law and civil law approaches to guilty pleas are noted. 
92  Ibid., at page 439. 
93  ILC Draft, Article 38, para. 1 lit.d) (UN-Document A/49/10, p110 ff.). As Behrens interestingly 
observes, the Appeals Chamber in Erdemović (decided during this phase of the negotiations) were forced to 
re-open the proceedings following the revelation by the accused that his guilty plea had been entered under 
duress and he had not been informed precisely about the nature of his plea. Behrens, supra note __, at page 
459, 
94  Schabas, supra note __, at page 150, suggests that this provision was forced because of a general 
misconception on the part of certain civil law countries that undertakings between the prosecutor and the 
judge were binding at common law. 
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instance, Article 76.1. refers only to the Trial Chamber’s obligation to ‘take 
into account the evidence presented and the submissions made’, whilst 
Article 78.1. points vaguely to offence gravity and individual circumstances 
as being relevant to the determination of sentence. Rule 145 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence does little more than explicitly mention the 
relevance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances (Rule 145.1.(b)), give 
further examples of individual circumstances (Rule 145.1.(c)), and provide 
two examples of mitigating circumstances (Rule 145.2.(a)(i) and (ii)). 
Nowhere is there any explicit recognition or consideration of the following 
crucial issues: 
 
• Whether a guilty plea counts as a mitigating factor. 
 
• If so, what conditions, circumstances or principles should govern the 
impact that the guilty plea has on the final sentence determination. 
 
The absence of any discussion of these matters, or their elaboration in the 
ICC Statute or Rules, is a matter of considerable concern. 
 
The absence of rationalisations for sentencing within the foundation 
instruments of the ICTY means that there is no clear basis for justifying the 
use of guilty plea discounts for those convicted of the specified international 
crimes. This lack of rationality is reflected in the confusion which appears to 
persist in decisions of the ICTY – which we set out in Part A.(b) above – as 
to whether the guilty plea is a mitigating factor justifiable on the basis of the 
accused’s alleged remorse or contrition.  
           
There are two interconnected issues raised by this debate which 
arguably should have received attention and clarification in the foundational 
documents of the ICTY. The first concerns the status of the guilty plea as a 
mitigating factor, and the second relates to whether remorse, cooperation, 
and accepting responsibility should be treated as entirely separate factors 
from the guilty plea in their effects upon sentence. The notion that remorse 
should be considered separately from the guilty plea as mitigation is 
consistent with aspects of both inquisitorial and adversarial criminal 
procedure, since it is often absent from the former, and of little relevance to 
the latter.95 Some of the ICTY’s jurisprudence leans in this direction.  That 
                                                 
95  See R. Henham Sentence Discounts and the Criminal Process (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 
2001). 
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said, there is an unprincipled element to this jurisprudence, leading to the 
concerns we identified earlier in Part A.(b) regarding cumulative mitigation. 
Although it may be argued that pleading guilty is in some way an 
‘acceptance of responsibility,’96 the problem remains that whether the 
defendant accepts responsibility because he is truly contrite, or for tactical 
reasons, is an inherently subjective issue.97 If the ICTY had made the 
purpose of guilty pleas clear in its Statute this would have paradoxically 
strengthened the position of those who would wish to defend it, and 
provided a clear rationale for its subsequent use in the Trial Chamber. Whilst 
we would clearly not endorse any such justification, a rational basis for 
action would have been preferable to the obfuscated reasoning and vacuum 
which currently persists. This substantially weakens the efficacy of the 
ICTY’s professed search for ‘truth’, the perceived legitimacy of its outcomes 
and its ability to contribute in more constructive ways to the reconstruction 
of societies damaged by war and social conflict. 
 
 
C.  Beyond the Individual Defendant: Plea Bargains, Trial Ideology, and 
Truth-Telling 
 
In this section we consider: (1) the relationship between plea 
bargaining and the trial ideology of the ICTY, in particular the tensions 
between legitimacy and pragmatics and the effect of these tensions on ICTY 
penology; and (2) the effects of plea bargains on truth-telling and 
reconciliation. 
 
(a) Relationship of Plea Bargaining to Contrasting Models of 
Trial Justice for the Former Yugoslavia  
 
What does the institutionalisation of plea bargaining as administrative 
policy within ICTY penality mean for models of trial justice? The purpose 
of this inquiry is to gauge the extent to which ICTY justice as presently 
conceived can be said to correspond with notions of what constitutes 
                                                 
96  As in the US Federal system.  See also Sentencing Advisory Panel, Reduction in Sentence for a 
Guilty Plea, June 2004, available online at http://www.sentencing-
guidelines.gov.uk/c_and_a/advice/guilty_pleas/foreword.html (the English Sentencing Advisory Panel’s 
advice to the Sentencing Guideline Council on sentence discounts propounding that, since the rationale for 
the guilty plea is clearly based on system considerations, it should be unrelated to personal mitigation and 
considered separately). 
97  It is even an argument for saying that a truly remorseful offender would be prepared to accept just 
punishment without any expectation of a reduction in sentence. 
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legitimate punishment on the part of those significantly affected by the trial 
process. However, it should be recognised that the reconciliation of 
principles for international criminal justice with local demands for justice 
(such as those existing within the Former Yugoslavia) entails developing 
theory and modelling for understanding processual activity comparatively, in 
order to take account of cultural relativism and moral relativity. 
Consequently, an approriate analytical framework for understanding the 
complexities of trial decision-making, whether at the global or local level, is 
vital in deconstructing the social reality of decision-making in international 
criminal trials and providing the knowledge necessary to evaluate the 
prospects for trial transformation.98     
 
The conventional starting point for any discussion of theoretical 
modelling of the criminal process in common law jurisdictions has been 
Packer’s99 seminal distinction between crime control and due process. 
Whilst a paradigm of due process (such as Packer’s) is not normatively 
prescriptive, it can be used to judge whether process measures up to a 
taxonomy of idealised due process characteristics. Despite the many 
qualifications and critiques of Packer’s modelling,100 it remains important in 
highlighting fundamental distinctions affecting the balance between 
individual and system interests in criminal processes.101 These distinctions 
might be portrayed for international criminal justice in terms of the 
following basic paradigms of trial justice: 
 
     (i) The pragmatic model – in this conceptualisation judges equate trial 
justice as consistent with the achievement of system objectives. Hence, the 
ideology of international trial justice is conveyed through symbolism and 
rhetoric. In this model guilty pleas/plea agreements are valued as 
contributing to the achievement of bureaucratic goals of speed, efficiency 
and the maximisation of resources.102 
                                                 
98  For detailed discussion of these issues see, M. Findlay and R. Henham Transforming Criminal 
Justice: retributive and restorative justice in the trial process (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 
forthcoming). 
99  H. Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969)  
100  Most significant being his failure to account for context and power variables. For a useful 
summary see, L. Zedner Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at pages 116-120. 
101  Hudson suggests that tensions between liberty and security are replicated for criminal justice in the 
due process/crime control dichotomy; B. Hudson Justice in the Risk Society: Challenging and Reaffirming 
Justice in Late Modernity (London: Sage Publications, 2003). 
102  This model appears largely consistent with Packer’s notion of crime control except that the 
paradox between crime control and due process lies in the significant discretionary power of international 
judges. The impetus against due process is therefore driven by judicial power exercised pragmatically. 
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     (ii) The legitimacy model – here trial justice is conceived in terms of a 
synergy between ideology and outcomes. Consequently, international 
criminal trials are seen as transformative structures whose primary function 
is to provide the means of reconciling the ideology and the morality of 
punishment for victims and post-conflict societies. This model conceives of 
guilty pleas/plea agreements as lacking in moral legitimacy in the context of 
trial justice because they do not serve rationalisations for punishment. 
Although it may be argued that enhancing the speed of punishment, saving 
court time and expense, absolving the need for victim/witness testimony, 
encouraging cooperation with the authorities and the further identification of 
suspects are all beneficial consequences of plea bargains, none of these 
rationalisations are concerned with supporting an ideological purpose for 
international penality which has moral legitimacy in the eyes of all the 
significant players in the ICTY process.103 
 
Whilst our analysis of plea bargaining in the ICTY suggests that Trial 
Chambers, despite the apparent reservations announced in Momir Nikolić, 
currently favour a pragmatic model of trial justice, we argue strongly for a 
reconceptualisation favouring justice principles which correspond more 
closely with what trial participants regard as their legitimate expectations for 
punishment, whether they be retributive, restorative or mixed. In effect, we 
are suggesting that there should be a shift in the ideological justification for 
trial justice predicated upon the ideal of using the trial and punishment 
process as a means of harmonising and satisfying (as far as possible) 
conflicting demands for justice.104 The existence of this ideological 
commitment (currently absent from the ICTY’s foundational instruments) 
will serve to promote due process and ensure that the discretionary power of 
Trial Chamber judges is utilised constructively in the process of developing 
a more polycentric and, perhaps, restoratively-orientated framework for 
transitional justice in post-conflict societies such as the Former Yugoslavia.        
 
As currently conceptualised, there is an inherent philosophical 
contradiction in the arguments advanced in support of the restorative 
capability of plea agreements in international criminal trials. Firstly, the 
ICTY cannot effectively divorce itself from the administrative efficiency 
argument. In Momir Nikolić, for example, the Trial Chamber essentially 
                                                 
103  The legitimacy model goes beyond Packer’s notions of due process because it focuses on the 
moral reasons for principles of trial justice. 
104  For further elaboration of these arguments, see Findlay and Henham, supra note ___. 
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tried to argue that the trial ideology of the ICTY forces a reconceptualisation 
of plea agreements.105 We are asked to suspend belief in those rationales and 
implications that do not sustain the ICTY’s professed search for ‘truth’ (such 
as, control of process; suppression of evidence; exclusion from participation; 
denial of process; erosion of rights; absence of public accountability) in 
return for a vision of plea agreements as procedural mechanisms that nurture 
the ideological thrust of international penality towards achieving the 
constructive ideals of reconciliation and reconstruction.  Without denying 
that this may be one effect of plea agreements, it is equally important not to 
overstate the truth-telling and reconciliatory effects of plea agreements, as 
we argue in Part C (b) below. Nevertheless, rhetoric about the restorative 
capabilities of plea agreements conveniently ignores the substantive reasons 
for their increased use in common law jurisdictions in recent years.106 It 
emphasises a justification for their continuation and expansion that 
effectively redefines the underlying rationale for the existence of plea 
agreements as procedural expedients. 
 
In its discussion of Principles and Purposes,107 The Trial Chamber in 
Momir Nikolić made no real attempt to take the issue of rationality further 
than in previous cases. The Trial Chamber’s analysis provides a very 
circumscribed and one-dimensional view of its penality, dominated by the 
perception that the objectives of international punishment are somehow 
achievable through simple enforcement of the rule of law. This is most 
apparent in its discussion of deterrence: 
 
One of the main purposes of a sentence imposed by an international 
tribunal is to influence the legal awareness of the accused, the 
surviving victims, their relatives, the witnesses and the general public 
                                                 
105  The Trial Chamber was at pains to stress the dual conception of trial ideology for the ICTY; that 
of putting an end to impunity for those who perpetrate gross breaches of international humanitarian law, on 
the one hand, and contributing to peace and reconciliation, on the other.  Momir Nikolić, paras. 58-62. It 
used this ideology to distinguish its mandate from national criminal justice systems by arguing that the 
principled use of plea agreements actually made a constructive contribution towards full accountability, and 
distanced itself (implicitly) from the remarks of Judge Cassese in Erdemović supporting their use for (inter 
alia) reasons of bureaucratic and administrative expediency. In so doing, the Trial Chamber again stressed 
the argument that guilty pleas can often make a significant contribution to peace and reconciliation, 
particularly when coupled with sincere expressions of remorse.  Id. para. 72. Procedural safeguards would 
ensure that the interests of ‘justice’ were not compromised. 
106  Notwithstanding their tacit or overt acceptance in an increasing number of civil or hybridised 
jurisdictions in recent years; see further, F. Tulkens ‘Negotiated Justice’ in M. Delmas-Marty and J. R. 
Spencer (eds.) European Criminal Procedures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) at pages 
641-687. 
107  Momir Nikolić, paras. 127-140. 
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in order to reassure them that the legal system is implemented and 
enforced. Additionally, the process of sentencing is intended to 
convey the message that globally accepted laws and rules have to be 
obeyed by everybody. ‘All persons shall be equal before the courts 
and tribunals.’ This fundamental rule fosters the internalisation of 
these laws and rules in the minds of legislators and the general 
public.108 
 
In effect, the Trial Chamber is arguing that international sentencing has a 
pedagogical function in terms of re-enforcing adherence to the rule of law; it 
promotes consistency and equality of treatment – no-one can escape with 
impunity; it also suggests that public denunciation through punishment has 
more than an educatory function – it promotes the internalisation of the 
values implicit in the declared ideology of the ICTY. The utilitarian message 
underlying this passage is that retributive and deterrent justifications are 
operationalised through sentencing into outcomes which are inherently 
moral because they sustain the rules of international humanitarian law. This 
assumed transformation of ideology into informed moral action on the part 
of the intended audience is highly conjectural. The passage implicitly 
acknowledges the symbolic importance of public denunciation as an aspect 
of deterrence, invoking the Durkheimian notion that the universally accepted 
morality of the tribunal’s mission (and its underlying rationality) is sufficient 
to justify punishment in terms capable of identifying, reconciling and 
satisfying demands for global and local justice.    
  
However, this assumption is seriously flawed and raises some 
fundamental questions which go to the legitimacy of international criminal 
justice. For example, is it realistic to suggest that law (or, more specifically, 
punishment norms) effectively influence the internalisation of morals? 
Similarly, can universally accepted moral principles be transformed into 
normatively effective principles for action through sentencing?  The answers 
to these questions are by no means clear.109 What does seem certain, 
however, is the need for legal and processual norms to be perceived as 
legitimate by those who are significantly affected by their operation. The 
fact that such norms exist to give effect to universally held moral principles 
may be sufficient for both to be regarded as legitimate in the eyes of the 
                                                 
108  Id. para. 139. 
109  See further, R. Henham Theory and Contextual Analysis in Sentencing 29 INT’L. J. 
SOC. L. 253 (2001). 
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wider international community. However, it is important to distinguish the 
fact that, for victims and others affected by social conflict, legitimacy also 
depends on whether international punishment actually resonates with 
understandings of local penality.  
 
Attempts by the ICTY to redefine or reposition plea agreements in 
recent case law compound the obfuscation already apparent in the model for 
justice delivery underwritten by the international criminal institutions, as 
personified by the trial and the ideology of trial justice. As we have argued, 
the moral legitimacy of the international trial form and its ideological 
justification, although symbolised by a universal appeal to humanitarian 
principles, is, nevertheless, grounded in the penality of retributivism and, 
secondarily, deterrence. Particularising ownership of the universal requires a 
paradigm shift in trial ideology through the recognition that the legitimacy of 
trial justice must have concrete (i.e. contextual) significance and that this 
legitimacy is largely communitarian in significance. Consequently, 
procedural norms are context specific to the exten  that their legitimacy can 
only be assessed within the ideological framework in which they operate.  
 
A paradox emerges between the ideology and practice of plea 
bargaining within the predominantly retributive context of international 
penality. We have seen how the foundation instruments of the ICTY and the 
ICC, coupled with the wide discretionary powers given to international 
judges in sentencing matters, allow international sentencers (albeit largely 
eclectically) to promote retributive as well as utilitarian justifications for 
punishment. Any repositioning of ICTY trial ideology should  focus on 
maximising the instrumental capacity of discretionary decision-making for 
accommodating retributive and reductivist considerations at important 
decision sites within the trial (such as sentence). Such an ideology ought to 
recognise that the legitimacy of international penality depends on the 
integration of  victims and victim communities, and that this should be 
ideological and normative. If the discretionary power of ICTY judges was 
available  to pursue legitimate restorative outcomes beyond those that follow 
from the determination of guilt or innocence, plea agreements and other 
forms of processual negotiation might be re-defined in more constructive 
terms. 
 
(b) Effects of Plea Bargaining on Transitional Justice: Truth-
Telling and Reconciliation 
 
Pr
e-P
rin
t
The ICTY declares that ‘a guilty plea is always important for the 
purpose of establishing the truth in relation to a crime.’110 It also has held 
that guilty pleas ‘[u]ndoubtedly tend[] to further a process of 
reconciliation.’111 Is the ICTY’s optimism justified?  We recognise that 
when the ICTY (or any other trial institution) asserts that plea or other 
processual negotiation can contribute to peace and reconciliation,112 it does 
so within a particular ideological context (and, in this case, to promote 
particular pragmatic needs). This is not to deny the reality of what is 
asserted; rather, it simply recognises that normative behaviour is controlled 
and legitimised by ideology and policy.113 On the other hand, just because 
that the ICTY asserts a good faith belief that plea bargains promote truth-
telling and reconciliation does not mean that this belief ought to be relieved 
or immunised from scrutiny. A contrario, this invites subjecting that belief to 
rigourous examination.  
 
 Any assessment of the relationship between plea agreements, on the 
one hand, and truth-telling, restoration, and reconciliation, on the other, must 
assess – in a forthright manner – the consequences of the three levels of 
discount that inhere in negotiated pleas, in particular charge bargains.  
 
First, there is a reduction in the severity of sentence for the charges to 
which the offender actually pleads guilty. In Part A of this paper, we detailed 
the quantum of reduction in the overall data.  This reduction animates 
concerns within victim communities as to whether the ICTY is attaining its 
                                                 
110  Todorović, para. 81 (cited in Mrdja, para. 76). See also Češić, para. 58 (‘The Trial Chamber 
accepts that the guilty plea helps to establish the truth and may aid the process of reconciliation in the 
Brcko municipality.  More particularly, a guilty plea, whereby an accused recognises his/her responsibility 
and specifies the circumstances in which the crimes were committed, is likely to provide a sense of relief to 
the surviving victims and the victims’ relatives and friends.  A guilty plea also saves the witnesses from the 
possible trauma of re-living the events while testifying in court.’ See also Sikirica, para. 149 (‘a guilty plea 
contributes directly to one of the fundamental objectives of the international tribunal: namely, its truth-
finding function.’).  But see also Deronjić, para. 134 (ICTY Trial Chamber coming to a somewhat 
contradictory position by holding that it ‘is not the final arbiter of historical facts,’ as that ‘is for 
historians’).   
111   Deronjić, para. 134. See also Plavšić, paras. 70-80 (emphasising truth and reconciliation effects of 
plea bargains). 
112  Obrenović, para. 112 (citing comments of a Bosnian Muslim from Srebrenica that the defendant’s 
plea and confession, while far from an apology, brought relief and acknowledgement). 
113  A specific example of how such control might be exercised is through the principle which asserts 
that no accused should be penalised for exercising the right to go to trial and have the prosecution prove its 
case. As suggested earlier, experience from common law jurisdictions confirms that trial ideology controls 
the operation of this principle to the disadvantage of those opting for full trial through the so-called ‘trial 
penalty’; see, C. McCoy and R. Henham Guilty Plea Discounts in American and English Courts: An 
Empirical Description and Ethical Critique of the Trial Penalty (2004) available online at 
http://www.nls.ntu.ac.uk/CLR/ICTP/index.htm. 
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retributive aspirations. There is a mixed record of public response when 
perpetrators of mass atrocity plead guilty.114 
 
Second, and more germane to concerns over truth-telling and 
reconciliation, the offender discounts the public process of the trial and 
generally pleads guilty only to the bare factual allegations in an indictment, 
instead of contending with the gruesome, detailed evidence admitted in trial 
and necessary to convict on those allegations. What is more, the offender 
does not have to face victims in court and, although some victims may not 
relish testifying, for others providing viva voce testimony may be a salutary 
expressive experience. Witnesses are only rarely called when a Trial 
Chamber has to validate a plea agreement, although they may be called at 
the sentencing hearing. This second level of discount could be mitigated if 
the sentencing hearing became a space where witnesses and victims could 
testify, or at least provide victim impact statements, such that the sentencing 
hearing would become a public and expressive forum.  
 
That said, the public narration of the tragedy and the attendant 
cathartic consequences that could arise from an expanded sentencing hearing 
are undercut by the third level of discount, namely that the offender usually 
bargains for the Prosecutor to drop a number of charges.115  For example, in 
the Plavšić plea bargain affirmed by the ICTY, Plavšić pleaded guilty to one 
count of persecution as a crime against humanity and the Prosecutor dropped 
the remaining seven charges, including two counts of genocide and 
complicity in genocide.  The plea bargain therefore buries many allegations 
and consequently erases those victims and bars the determination of the 
truths of their claims.  The allegations themselves become no more than 
withdrawn charges or, worse, a bargaining chip.   
 
This also was the case in the Deronjić plea bargain, which established 
the truth only regarding the tragedy that encompassed one village on one 
particular day, thereby obfuscating several other potential truths – namely 
                                                 
114  See Combs, supra note __, at 936 (discussing public responses to the Plavšić guilty plea in Serb, 
Croat, and Bosnian Muslim communities and noting that ‘truth telling is one thing; deal cutting is 
another.’). 
115  See, e.g. Mrdja (charge of crime against humanity dropped as part of the plea bargain); Deronjić, 
paras. 14, 18 (six counts in original indictment reduced to one charge in plea agreement); Momir Nikolić 
(plea bargain involved the Prosecution dropping the genocide charges); Babić (pleaded guilty to one count 
of persecution as a crime against humanity in exchange for the Prosecutor agreeing to drop four other 
charges). 
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accusations involving other spaces and places in Bosnia.116 That said, the 
Deronjić judges, although emphasising truth-telling and reconciliation as a 
rationale supporting plea bargaining, also recognised evident limitations to 
this rationale by concluding that ‘this Tribunal is not the final arbiter of 
historical facts.  That is for historians.  For the judiciary focusing on core 
issues of a criminal case before this International Tribunal, it is important 
that justice be done and be seen to be done, within the ambit of the 
Indictment presented by the Prosecution.’117 For Judge Schomburg, in 
dissent, the Prosecutor should have presented all the evidence available. 
From his perspective, concerns of judicial economy call for limiting charges 
only if a just judgement remains possible: ‘The test should be, whether 
individual separable parts of an offense or several violations of law 
committed as a result of the same offense are not particularly significant for 
the penalty to be imposed.’118 In his mind, the Deronjić agreement did not 
meet this test. Judge Schomburg’s approach would retool the ICTY’s 
approach to plea bargaining in a manner that already may be contemplated 
by the extensive jurisprudence regarding concurrent sentencing, but would 
also provide room for more truths to emerge unless such t uths were 
redundant. 
 
There is some evidence that decisions by the Prosecution to drop 
charges to secure pleas to other charges frustrates victims, sows 
arbitrariness, and weakens legitimacy.119 For example, following the 
Obrenović and Momir Nikolić plea agreements, groups representing families 
of the victims ‘expressed hurt and outrage that the charges of complicity 
with genocide … were dropped. In their eyes this was tantamount to the 
tribunal saying that genocide did not take place.’120 Those cases in which 
genocide charges are dropped present a unique situation insofar as the 
charge bargaining means that the ‘crime of all crimes’ is not determined to 
apply to a particular situation. To be sure, the ICTY Prosecutor has 
experienced difficulty in securing genocide convictions, and the only 
violence thus far officialised as genocide is that which occurred in 
Srebrenica. However, when claims are bargained away so, too, is the chance 
not just to tell the truth, but advance the argument that what happened in 
other places also amounted to genocide.  
                                                 
116  Deronjić dissenting judgement, para. 4.   
117  Deronjić, para 135. 
118  Deronjić dissenting judgement, para. 8. 
119  Simons, supra note ___. 
120  Srebrenica Justice Campaign, Bulletin No. 7 (January 2004) pp. 8-9 (on file with author). 
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The upshot is that in the case of high-level accused (where the 
exacting nature of criminal law requires the leader to be traced to the body 
interred in the mass grave) plea bargains may offer a partial print of the truth 
whose value exceeds that of the acquittal that might result if the Prosecutor 
fails to satisfy the high threshold of proof required by the ICTY’s Rules of 
Evidence.  Many offenders who plead guilty do admit wrongdoing. Some 
express remorse – perhaps even apologise – and educate the public about the 
crimes in question. These offenders may even implicate others, although not 
all are willing to do so.  For example, Plavšić has refused to involve anyone 
else in the violence or testify in any other cases.121   The bargained-for 
testimony of  Momir Nikolić was subsequently found by the ICTY to be 
evasive and lacking in credibility.122 On the other hand, although it is too 
early for definitive proof of truth-telling, the convictions regarding 
Srebrenica (Krstić – which was by way of trial – and  Plavšić, Obrenović, 
Momir Nikolić – each by plea agreement) may have played some role in the 
eventual admission of responsibility by Bosnian Serb leadership for the 
Srebrenica massacre. In June 2004, a report commissioned by Bosnia’s Serb 
Republic admitted for the first time that units under the government’s 
control ‘participated’ in the July 1995 massacre.123   
 
Contrition may prove to be more forthcoming under the ICC, which, 
as we explore in Part B,  speaks not of guilty pleas, but, rather, of 
proceedings on an admission of guilt.124 Assuredly, this is as of yet untested.  
Moreover, the intersection of the more inquisitorial approach of the ICC 
with the plea bargain remains foggy.  Although plea bargains may fit more 
comfortably with the adversarial approach that characterises the ICTY, it is 
unclear how responsive they will be to inquisitorial modalities, at least as far 
as charge bargaining is concerned.  To some extent, the legitimacy of plea 
bargains cannot be disentangled from broader conceptual debates regarding 
adversarial methodologies characteristic of the common law and 
inquisitorial methodologies characteristic of the civil law. In this vein, 
                                                 
121  Combs, supra note ___. at  934. 
122   Momir Nikolić, para. 156.  See also Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A (ICTY Appeals 
Chamber, April 19, 2004) para. 94 (ICTY Appeals Chamber hesitating to rely independently on plea-
bargained testimony from Deronjić in the proceedings against Krstić owing to discrepancies in  Deronjić’s 
testimony and the ambiguity surrounding some the statements he made). 
123  Nicholas Wood, Bosnian Serbs Admit Responsibility for the Massacre of 7,000, N.Y. TIMES (June 
12, 2004). The admission did not refer to the massacre as an act of genocide.  
124  See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9* (1999), arts. 65-
66. 
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although our assessment of the merits of plea bargains is more functional in 
nature (i.e. how, if at all, do plea bargains advance or improve upon the 
goals of international criminal justice), it also is possible to situate plea 
bargains within a broader legal debate as to the suitability of inquisitorial or 
adversarial approaches to resolve mass criminality.  That said, careful 
comparative analysis of municipal legal systems suggests that pleas are used 
– albeit to different degrees – in both civil law and common law systems, 
and used differently by nations within each legal tradition, thereby 
suggesting a fragmentation within each legal family.125 This may in fact 
indicate an overlapping convergence among legal systems and fragmentation 
within legal systems that suggest that comparative legal analysis may risk 
essentialising the differences among legal systems.   
 
In the end, the relationship between plea bargains and transitional 
justice goals (which we would loosely describe as truth-telling, restoration, 
and reconciliation) is complex.  We fault the ICTY for the simplistic causal 
connections it plots between plea agreements and the promotion of 
transitional justice. We also explore concerns that these connections may 
embellish the ICTY’s actual motivations, namely managerial pragmatism.  
That said, we applaud the ICTY’s declaration of the importance of 
transitional concerns and its attempt to engage the individualised criminal 
process as a vehicle to promote these collective, and often highly political, 
goals.  At this point in time, it seems too early to conclude that plea 
agreements promote these transitional concerns in as clear a way as the 
ICTY hypothesises. We believe that more nuanced understanding of the 
connection between plea agreements and transitional justice is desirable.  
This would ensure that the positive aspects of plea bargains – namely, the 
dissemination of some truth and accountability – are not overshadowed by 
corrosive contempt among victim communities regarding the benefits that 
were doled out to perpetrators in order to obtain what may be pithy truths 
and shaky accountability.  When such overshadowing occurs, plea bargains 
can impede transitional justice instead of fostering it. 
  
 
D. Conclusion 
  
                                                 
125  Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea 
Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1, 37-38, 62 
(2004). 
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We began this article by pointing to the need for some kind of 
theoretical framework to inform the plea bargaining practices of the ICTY. 
Our subsequent analysis has revealed inconsistency and obfuscation as 
regards the praxis of pleading guilty and plea bargaining and raised serious 
doubts about the contribution such practices can make to the achievement of 
peace and reconciliation in post-conflict societies beyond the furtherance of 
the purely system interests of the institutions of international criminal 
justice. Although we indicate a number of interrelated factors as responsible 
for this state of affairs, we suggest that the ideology of international trial 
justice as practiced in the ICTY may play a catalytic role. The pervading 
retributive ideology of ICTY justice and the normative framework 
supporting it, rather than resisting systemic pressures for concessions and 
compromise, displays a tendency towards facilitating their exponential 
expansion. There is little resistance because such an ideology, wherever 
operationalised, inevitably draws sustenance from measures that encourage 
retributive objectives, the control of narratives, and the efficient 
management of risk. In the present scenario, these tendencies are 
exacerbated by the unprincipled development of individualised 
sentencing,126 which promotes a form of eclecticism.  
 
Our hopes are realistic. Assuredly, political realities, as well as time 
and resource constraints, may increase pressures to secure plea bargains for 
the ICTY. The challenge, both theoretical and practical, is to encourage an 
ideological shift in sentencing which recognises that a key to trial justice 
requires the pluralisation of ideology to include a consideration of diverse 
approaches, including restorative themes, in sentencing praxis. This does not 
imply an immediate wholesale change in the normative structure.127 It could 
be achieved quite straightforwardly in the short term128 by the Appeals 
Chamber setting about a reformulation of the purposes and practice of 
sentencing in a re-statement of aims and principles designed to draw the 
                                                 
126   This is not a contradiction in terms since it is arguably necessary to establish the ideal sentencing 
pattern for any given jurisdiction in order to combat the problems associated with subjective disparity. This 
should be achieved by first deciding upon the aim(s) of sentencing, or the order of priority among 
competing aims. At the very least, we suggest that any measures which militate against producing 
disproportionality between the seriousness of the offence and the sentence should be encouraged 
127  Something which is evidently impractical in the case of the ICTY. 
128  Solutions which involve providing authoritative lists of aggravating and mitigating factors, 
maintaining proportionality as the guiding principle giving way to individualisation in various types of 
cases, or relying on appeal systems to remedy subjective disparities are insufficient to offset the distorting 
effect of negotiated forms of justice. For a paradigm which envisages a constructive and strategic role for 
trial justice in the healing and rebuilding of broken communities and lives see, Findlay and Henham, supra, 
note __, ch. 8. 
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discretionary power of ICTY judges towards engagement with a much 
broader and polycentric range of sentence justification.  We submit that such 
a theoretical re-structuring will at least provide a context within which the 
merits of plea bargains in individual cases can be rigourously assessed for 
their compliance with the broader interests of victims and victim 
communities rather than the narrow system interests which they currently 
seem to serve. Although these interests are not devoid of some benefit, we 
believe that international criminal justice can strive to do better, particularly 
as it deepens in confidence and maturity. 
 
 
